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Abstract. This article argues that the decisive part of the interaction between social
movements and political authorities is no longer the direct, physical confrontation
between them in concrete locations, but the indirect, mediated encounters among
contenders in the arena of the mass media public sphere. Authorities react to social
movement activities if and as they are depicted in the mass media, and conversely
movement activists become aware of political opportunities and constraints through
the reactions (or non-reactions) that their actions provoke in the public sphere. The
dynamics of this mediated interaction among political contenders can be analyzed as
an evolutionary process. Of the great variety of attempts to mobilize public atten-
tion, only a few can be accommodated in the bounded media space. Three selection
mechanisms–labelled here as “discursive opportunities” – can be identified that affect
the diffusion chances of contentious messages: visibility (the extent to which a mes-
sage is covered by the mass media), resonance (the extent to which others – allies,
opponents, authorities, etc.–react to a message), and legitimacy (the degree to which
such reactions are supportive). The argument is empirically illustrated by showing how
the strategic repertoire of the German radical right evolved over the course of the 1990s
as a result of the differential reactions that various strategies encountered in the mass
media arena.
As the work of Charles Tilly1 has shown us, before the advent of the
modern, democratic nation-state, interactions between protesters, au-
thorities, and publics were mostly localized, immediate, and direct.
People would gather at the premises of a merchant, a landowner, or the
seat of a local authority, and make their demands audible and visible
by way of chants, slogans, petitions, or direct action such as the seizure
of grain or physical attack on the wrongdoer. The power-holders thus
addressed would respond in equally immediate and direct ways, by
having the local police or private strongmen disperse the protesters,
receiving a delegation to hear and respond to their grievances, or by
themselves addressing the crowd, to rebut criticism or perhaps to an-
nounce concessions. Usually, neither of the parties directly involved in
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such events had a wider public in mind when they made their decisions
on how to act or react, and if a public was relevant at all, it was the
bystanders physically present at the event, who observed the spectacle
and perhaps took sides by cheering or shouting abuse.
Such direct engagements between protesters, authorities, and publics
have certainly not disappeared completely. Even in the age of global-
ization, many protests still take place where the targets of claims are
located: in national capitals, in seats of supranational institutions such
as Brussels, Geneva, or New York, or where state leaders gather for
international summits, e.g., in Seattle, Davos, or Genoa. But nowadays
protesters rarely get to see the addressees of their demands, nor do the
latter directly observe, let alone engage, with the protesters. Bystander
publics may still be present and occasionally they still cheer and boo,
but it is no longer the co-present public that counts most, but the mass
audience that sits at home and watches or reads the media coverage
of the demonstration. In the context of mass electoral politics, the im-
portance for both protesters and authorities of winning the sympathy
of this audience has increased enormously. It is in the news media,
moreover, that the most relevant part of the mutual observation and
interaction between protesters and authorities takes place. Authorities
will not react to – and will often not even know about – protests that
are not reported in the media, and if they are reported, they will not
react to the protests as they “really” were, but as they appeared in the
media. If authorities find protests worthy of public response, that re-
action is usually not communicated directly to the protesters by, say,
calling up the organizers and expressing support for their cause, but by
saying so in the media, and that message is usually not just addressed
at the protesters and their sympathizers, but also at third parties such
as political opponents and competitors, and last but not least at the
elusive mass audience. Even in the case of the one still important form
of direct engagement between protesters and authorities, namely that
between the police and demonstrators, it is often more significant and
consequential for both sides how their actions are depicted, evaluated,
and reacted upon on the media stage than what actually happened on
the scene.2
Of course, the crucial role of the mass media has not gone unnoticed
by students of modern social movements and collective action. Sev-
eral studies have dealt with the biases and distortions of the mass
media from an activist point-of-view,3 and others have developed rec-
ommendations for how activists can best cope with these biases and
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turn them to their advantage.4 The structure of biases in media coverage
of protests was already addressed in a few studies in the 1970s,5 and has
become a core issue in social movement research in recent years as a
result of the advance of media-based protest event analysis as a central
methodological tool for the analysis of contentious politics.6 While the
media now occupy center stage from a methodological point-of-view,
they have as yet not been given their due place in theorizing on social
movements. Typically, in Dynamics of Contention, McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly’s recent attempt to synthesize the social movement field and
connect it to topics such as revolutions and democratization, one finds
dozens of mechanisms and processes listed that are seen as relevant to
explain contentious politics, but looks in vain for index entries such
as “mass media,” “public sphere,” or “communication.”7 As a result of
the studies into media selection and description biases, we now know a
lot about the factors that determine if and how the media cover protest,
but we have hardly begun to address the more important question of
how media coverage of protest, and the wider discourse surrounding
it, affect movements.
An exception to the lack of theoretical attention for the mass media’s
impact on social movements is the work of William Gamson.8 In an
important article with Gadi Wolfsfeld, the authors state:
Movements need the news media for three major purposes: mobilization, val-
idation, and scope enlargement. Regarding mobilization, most movements
must reach their constituency in part through some form of public discourse.
Public discourse is carried out in various forums, including the movement’s
own publications and meetings. But media discourse remains indispensable
for most movements because most of the people they want to reach are part
of the mass media gallery, while many are missed by movement-oriented
outlets. (. . .) Beyond needing the media to convey a message to their con-
stituency, movements need media for validation. The media spotlight vali-
dates the fact that the movement is an important player. Receiving standing in
the media is often a necessary condition before targets of influence will grant
a movement recognition and deal with its claims and demands. Conversely a
demonstration with no media coverage at all is a nonevent, unlikely to have
any positive influence on mobilizing followers or influencing the target. (. . .)
Finally, movements need the media to broaden the scope of conflict (. . .) the
introduction and subtraction of players alters the power relations between
the contestants. Where the scope is narrow, the weaker party has much to
gain and little to lose by broadening the scope, drawing third parties into the
conflict as mediators or partisans.9
That modern social movements need to rely to an important extent on
the media to reach constituencies, policy-makers, and third parties is
one side of the picture, but what is missed in Gamson and Wolfsfeld’s
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analysis as well as in most other studies of the relation between protest
and mass media is that the media are also crucial for the flow of com-
munication in the reverse direction. Movement activists depend to a
considerable degree on the mass media for information on the stand-
points of authorities, third parties, and the larger public on the issues
that concern them, and – because of the shift from immediate to me-
diated interaction – they learn about others’ reactions to their actions
from the news media. In other words, media discourse is both a crucial
source of strategic information on which movement activists base their
decisions, and a sounding board for the evaluation of strategies, and as
such provides the crucial information input for a next round of inter-
actions. What is true for social movement activists also holds for those
with whom they interact, be they authorities, countermovements, or
allies. All of them use the mass media as a crucial source of informa-
tion on each other’s views and behavior, and evaluate and adapt their
own strategies as a result of the reactions they bring about in the public
sphere.
In this article, I want to make a beginning with the development of a
theoretical framework that puts the public sphere, and the mass media
in particular, at the center of the analysis of political contention. Tak-
ing an evolutionary perspective on the dynamics of interaction in the
public sphere, I emphasize a number of selective mechanisms – which
I label “discursive opportunities” – that affect the diffusion chances
of messages in the public sphere. Subsequently, I argue that such a
focus on discursive opportunities and the evolutionary dynamics of
communicative interaction can help resolve the long-standing problem
of the linkage between opportunity structures and movement action.
To put some empirical flesh on the theoretical bones, I will conclude
the article with an illustration of my argument referring to evidence
on the development of radical right violence and the media discourse
surrounding it in Germany in the 1990s.
Before I continue to develop this argument, I would like to empha-
size at the outset that what I advocate here is not a form of media
reductionism. Obviously, even in our information age, there are sig-
nificant aspects of contentious interaction that do not depend on the
mass media. The media reality cannot replace the concrete feelings of
solidarity and shared identity, and the accompanying emotions of joy
or anger that are produced in concrete collective action and in direct
confrontations with countermovements or security forces in the streets.
In addition, indigenous networks and movement media are crucial as
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internal channels of communication and as a counterbalance to the
media images of a movement.10 Furthermore, resourceful and institu-
tionalized contenders, such as labor unions or employers associations,
may have direct access to policy-makers that makes them less depen-
dent on media attention, or may even make it advantageous for them to
circumvent the media altogether. My aim is not to deny the relevance of
extra-medial realities, but to call attention to the growing importance of
whether and how these realities are reflected in the media. Co-present
interactions will remain a crucial part of contentious politics, but the
wider implications of such events depend increasingly on if and how
they are communicated to relevant others who were not at the scene,
be they movement adherents in other locations, competitors and polit-
ical opponents, or authorities. That flow of communication, I argue, is
channeled largely through the mass media, with all the selection and
distortion that this entails.
Selection processes in the public sphere
The history of political contention is a hecatomb of failed attempts with
few survivors. What Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven have ob-
served long ago for poor people’s movements,11 is true for protest and
collective action in general: most attempts to challenge existing policies
and cultural codes remain marginal and inconsequential, and success,
however measured, is the rare exception.12 On an average day in a ran-
dom Western democracy, thousands of press statements are issued by
a variety of parties, interest groups, and movement organizations, hun-
dreds of demonstrations, meetings, strikes, vigils, and other protests
are staged, and numerous press conferences vie for the attention of
the public and policy-makers. Almost every conceivable position re-
garding an extremely wide range of viewpoints is represented among
this daily cacophony of messages, which call for some form of po-
litical or cultural change or seek the spread or implementation of a
particular practice or policy. Away from the mainstream of issues that
are generally considered important (e.g., unemployment, immigration)
and positions on these issues that are considered legitimate at a par-
ticular time and place, each democratic society harbors a wide variety
of groups who try to insert messages in the public sphere that are not
generally held to be important or legitimate, e.g., the interests of pigeon
breeders, or the call to revolution.
We easily ignore most of the voices in this chorus, for the simple reason
that what we actually see and hear are only the select few that have in
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one way or another been able to attract the attention of the media and
are considered relevant enough by other social actors to elicit public
responses from them. The reason for these strong selection pressures is
that the public sphere is a bounded space for political communication
characterized by a high level of competition. To be sure, the bound-
aries of the public sphere are not fixed, but can expand and contract over
time. For instance, the rise of new channels of communication such as
the Internet, or the multiplication of existing ones, e.g., through cable
and satellite television, may expand the structural boundaries of the
public sphere. At the same time, increasing commercialization of the
media and a shift toward entertainment and human interest rather than
political content may lead to a contraction of the communicative space
available for political discourse. In addition to such more structural
and long-term trends, the public sphere may also fluctuate importantly
within shorter time periods. During close election campaigns or politi-
cal crises, for instance, the media pay more attention to political issues
than during times of routine politics.
These structural and conjunctural shifts and fluctuations imply that the
public sphere is a loosely bounded space, but at any particular time
and place it is a bounded space nonetheless. The number of channels
of communication (newspapers, magazines, radio stations, television
networks, etc.) and the size of their respective news holes (pages, broad-
casting time, etc.) are by necessity limited. Compared to this available
communicative space, groups and individuals in modern democratic
societies make a huge number of attempts to insert messages in the
public sphere.13 The strong disproportion between the available space
in the public sphere and the number of messages that are potential can-
didates for inclusion in it, implies a high level of competition among
groups who aim to get their messages across in the public discourse.
To understand the dynamics of this competition, we need to begin by
distinguishing two categories of actors: the gatekeepers of the public
discourse, on the one hand, and the speakers of communicative mes-
sages, on the other.14 The gatekeepers of the public discourse are those
who decide which messages to include in the particular communicative
channel that they are responsible for, and how large and how promi-
nently these messages will be displayed. The selectivity of coverage
and the mechanisms of allocating prominence to messages are quite
well known for the traditional media and include decisions about the
size and placement of articles, or the amount and primacy of airing
time. Even in the seemingly non-hierarchical internet, providers, inter-
net browsers, and search engines pre-structure access to information
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on the web in such a way that certain sites are more easily and more
frequently accessed than they would have been in the absence of such
gatekeeping.
The actions of gatekeepers produce the first and most basic selection
mechanism in the public sphere that I distinguish: visibility.15 Visibility
depends on the number of communicative channels by which a message
is included and the prominence of such inclusion. It ranges from “invis-
ible” messages that are not included in any channel at all, via messages
with limited visibility, which are, for example, only covered by local
media, to “obtrusive” messages that are displayed prominently by most
channels. Visibility is a necessary condition for a message to influence
the public discourse, and, other things being equal, the amount of vis-
ibility that gatekeepers allocate to a message increases its potential to
diffuse further in the public sphere.16
From communications and media research we know quite a lot about
the so-called “news values” that structure the decisions of journalists
and editors to assign newsworthiness to events or not. These include,
for instance, (geographical) proximity, the prominence and prestige of
the speaker, the level of conflict related to the message or the actor, the
relevance of an issue, possibilities for dramatization and personaliza-
tion, and the novelty of a story.17 With the exception of the proximity
factor, these news values are not given characteristics of events, actors,
or messages that exist outside of, and prior to the discursive realm. They
are to an important extent a product of previous rounds of public dis-
course, from which notions of who is considered to be prominent, and
which issues are considered relevant or controversial have emerged.
Social movement organizers and other public actors know about these
selection criteria and try to anticipate them in how they bring their
messages across. Many modern protests, including Greenpeace-style
professional direct action, as well as more grassroots forms such as
anti-globalization protests at international summits, are to an impor-
tant extent scripted and staged to maximize the chances of drawing
media attention. However, there are severe limits to the degree to
which actors can influence the amount of visibility that is allocated
to their messages. Speakers can manipulate only a small range of as-
pects of newsworthiness, and much depends on how news values such
as prominence or relevance have come to be defined in past public
discourse. As a result, statements by “important” politicians tend to
get covered to a large extent regardless of their substantive content or
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original presentation, whereas less prominent actors have to go to great
lengths in order to realize their slight chances of access to the public
discourse.
This brings us to the role of other speakers in shaping the diffusion
chances of a particular actor’s messages in the public sphere. Other
speakers are the main source of two additional selection mechanisms:
resonance and legitimacy. Although gaining visibility is a necessary
condition for communicative impact, the career of a discursive mes-
sage is likely to remain stillborn if it does not succeed in provoking
reactions from other actors in the public sphere. The degree to which
a message provokes such reactions I call resonance.18 Resonance is
important for at least two reasons. First, messages that resonate travel
farther. Through the reactions of other actors, the message of the orig-
inal speaker is at least partially reproduced and may reach new audi-
ences. For instance, actors such as social movements who themselves
lack prominence and other discursive resources may receive an enor-
mous boost if established political actors express sympathy for their
demands. Such support carries the message to the constituency of the
ally in question, and allows the message to profit from that actor’s
prominence and prestige. This form of supportive resonance we may
call consonance. Consonance often takes the form of favorable ver-
bal statements, but includes in principle any public action that signals
support, endorsement, or encouragement of the actor, his actions, or
his aims, e.g., court rulings in favor of an actor, or executive action
meeting the actor’s demands.
Even negative resonance, or dissonance, may be helpful to the diffu-
sion of the original message.19 The maxim that “any publicity is good
publicity” also holds for political messages: even the rejection of a
demand has to reproduce that demand and thereby diffuses it further in
the public sphere. Dissonance includes any form of public action that
condemns, expresses disagreement with, or actively counters an actor,
his actions, or his aims, ranging from unfavorable verbal statements to
various forms of repression, as well as countermobilization by political
opponents.
Of course, the reproduction of messages by way of resonance is al-
ways imperfect. Even in the case of consonance, allies are likely to
support or emphasize only certain aspects of the original speaker’s
message. The distortion of the original message is of course likely
to be even stronger in the case of dissonant reactions. Nevertheless,
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even a strongly negative public reaction to a message has to repro-
duce the original message to at least some extent and thereby always
runs the risk of providing potential imitators with a model for suc-
cessful public action. For example, airplane hijackings with a high
public resonance are much more likely to inspire copycat events than
similar actions that provoke little resonance from the side of other pub-
lic actors.20 The second reason why resonance is important is that it
increases the actor’s chances to herself reproducing her message in
the public sphere. Messages that resonate, be it negatively or posi-
tively, become in the eyes of journalists and editors more relevant and
the actors behind them more prominent, thus increasing the speaker’s
chances to achieve a high level of visibility for similar messages in the
future.
While to some extent we can treat consonance and dissonance as hav-
ing similar effects because they both increase a message’s salience, in
other respects it must matter what the balance is between negative and
positive responses. The degree to which, on average, reactions by third
actors in the public sphere support or reject an actor or her claims, we
may call legitimacy. Defined in such a way, legitimacy is independent
of resonance. Highly legitimate messages may have no resonance at all
because they are uncontroversial, while highly illegitimate messages
may resonate strongly (e.g., anti-Semitic violence in Germany). All
other things being equal, one might expect legitimacy to have a pos-
itive effect on the diffusion chances of a message, but because of the
complex relation of legitimacy to resonance and visibility, other things
will rarely be equal. Ideally, the speaker would like high resonance and
high legitimacy, but will usually have to settle for less because normally
high resonance is only achieved at the cost of an increase in controver-
siality and thereby a net decrease in legitimacy. All in all, then, we may
perhaps expect a curvilinear relation between a message’s chances of
diffusion and its legitimacy, with messages whose legitimacy is contro-
versial generally better placed than either highly legitimate or highly
illegitimate messages.
Together, the notion of a bounded communicative space that can only
accommodate a small minority of the variegated candidates for entry,
on the one hand, and the selection mechanisms of visibility, resonance,
and legitimacy, on the other, form the basic building blocks of an
evolutionary model that allows us to explain why some actors and
some messages flourish and others perish in the competition for the
scarce resources of public attention and legitimacy.
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I use the term “evolutionary” not as a synonym for development, nor
to refer to progress or to genetic foundations of human behavior, but
to denote a particular set of mechanisms for explaining change, both
biological and social. Perhaps the most central idea at the basis of
Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory – inspired by Thomas Malthus’
work on population growth – was the insight of a severe discrepancy
between the number of individuals of any species that can be sustained
by a particular ecosystem, and the exponential reproduction rate of
each species in the absence of environmental constraints.21 The logical
conclusion is that only a small part of the offspring of any species will
be able to survive, and this in turn implies heavy competition, both
between individuals of any given species, and between different species
with overlapping ecological niches. Darwin’s second insight was that
there was variation within each species – as well as, of course, between
species – and that this necessarily implied that some individuals or
species would have better chances of surviving and producing offspring
under particular environmental conditions than others. As a result, the
average characteristics of any population will gradually change as a
function of environmental selective pressures, and given enough time
such change may culminate in the formation of new species.
This, in a nutshell, is the process of natural selection. Contrary to
what is sometimes thought, the most important source of selection in
Darwin’s eyes was not so much the physical environment (e.g., climate
or topography), but the biological environment in the form of food
and prey, predators, parasites, and competitors.22 In that sense, it is
better to speak of co-evolution, since evolutionary change consists of
many different agents evolving simultaneously and in close interaction,
changes in one species depending on, as well as affecting many others.23
This is also the reason why evolutionary processes are contingent, why
their outcomes cannot generally be anticipated by the actors involved,
and why there is a great discrepancy between evolutionary theory’s
explanatory power regarding past events and its very limited ability
to predict the future. The great appeal of evolutionary theory lies in
its potential to explain very complex outcomes through the interplay
of just a few key mechanisms: variation, environmental selection, and
differential reproduction.
My claim is that this type of explanation can also be applied to complex
social dynamics, and to the dynamics of contentious interaction in the
public sphere in particular. Of course, this is not an entirely new idea.
The approach advanced here builds on various attempts in different
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fields of sociological enquiry that draw on evolutionary thinking to
explain social change.24 These include macro-sociological and systems
theories;25 evolutionary game theory,26 population ecology approaches
in organizational sociology,27 as well as Hilgartner and Bosk’s work on
the careers of social problems.28
Analogous to a natural ecosystem, the public sphere is a bounded com-
municative space in which a variety of organizations, groups, and in-
dividuals compete for the scarce resources of public attention and le-
gitimacy. Given the restricted communicative space available, only a
small proportion of candidate messages will be included (visibility),
of these only some will be further diffused through the reactions of
other actors (resonance), and of these in turn only some will achieve
the status of legitimacy. Some contentious actors will be more success-
ful than others in gaining public attention and legitimacy – sometimes
because of more effective strategies, but often as a result of the unan-
ticipated reactions of other public actors. As a result of selection and
differential diffusion in the public sphere, the balance of discursive
power among actors will evolve over time. Similarly, discursive selec-
tion affects the evolution of the repertoire of single actors. Some of an
actor’s public actions will attract more attention and will attain greater
legitimacy than others, which will result in a repertoire shift towards
the more successful tactics, aims, or frames.29 Such repertoire shifts
may result from conscious strategic choices, but because of the diffi-
culty of anticipating other public actors’ reactions they will often arise
as emergent effects from contentious interaction, as in the case of the
German radical right discussed further below.
Bridging the gap between opportunity structures and movement
action
To prevent a radically constructionist reading of my argument along
the lines of “everything is text,” I want to emphasize that the discursive
opportunities I have highlighted are not free-floating media creations
that are independent of extra-medial power relations. To begin with,
much of mass media content consists of statements and actions by non-
media actors. Even if journalists and editors present us a small and not
necessarily representative selection of these statements and actions,
they cannot choose the raw material they must draw on. Moreover,
some of the most important selection criteria they use are not indepen-
dent from extra-medial power relations. For instance, the relevance and
privileged access attributed by the media to “prominent” actors such
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as government spokespersons depends crucially on the fact that these
actors are more politically relevant than others, whether the media like
it or not. Perhaps the media reinforce the dominance of institutional
actors, but by and large they have to live with that dominance just like
ordinary citizens do. Even so, it is crucial that what we are provided by
the media are only highly selective slices from the potential input of
political events, statements, and actions. Only these slices of reality be-
come publicly known, and as such they form the information basis for
actors’ evaluation of the effects of their actions, and other actors’ deci-
sions on how to react to them. Of course, actors may in addition have
media-independent information, beliefs, and assumptions about each
other’s intentions and behavior, but mediated information is the most
important or single source for many actors, and beliefs and assumptions
are to an important extent influenced by past media discourse.
This insight can be helpful to resolve an issue that scholars of social
movements and collective action have long struggled with, namely the
linkage between structure and action.30 On the one side, we find those
who emphasize the constraining and facilitating role of structural con-
texts, particularly so-called political opportunity structures.31 On the
other side, we find approaches that put agency at the center of analy-
sis and emphasize the purposive mobilization of material resources32
and symbolic frames33 as the driving force behind collective action.
One would be hard-pressed to find representatives on either side of this
divide, who would not agree that a combination of both is needed.
Gamson and Meyer have emphasized that political opportunities must
be perceived and are subject to interpretation or framing before they can
effectively influence movement activists’ decisions.34 Radicalizing this
view, Goodwin and Jasper state that “(t)here may be no such thing as
objective political opportunities before or beneath interpretation – or at
least none that matter; they are all interpreted through cultural filters.”35
Further in the same piece, the authors go a step further and claim that “in
many cases perceptions can create opportunities,”36 echoing Gamson
and Meyer’s point that by their actions, movements can make oppor-
tunities for themselves, as well as for other collective actors.37 The
consequence – explicitly intended by Goodwin and Jasper – of such
a subjectivist and voluntaristic view on political opportunities is that
it robs the concept of its structural character and puts agency firmly
in the drivers’ seat. Rather than solving the structure–agency prob-
lem, this invites the usual weaknesses of agency-based explanations,
namely that they have no convincing answer to the question why certain
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perceptions and interpretations of the political reality spread, but many
others not, and why certain actors may effectively succeed in opening
new windows of opportunity, but most do not. Moreover, the agency-
oriented perspective does not illuminate the origins of the interests,
identities, beliefs, assumptions, and expectations on which actors base
their decisions on if and how to act.
Obviously, I cannot offer a comprehensive solution to the problem of the
linkage of opportunity structures and movement action in this article.
I want to suggest, however, that an important part of the solution may
lie in the way in which the public sphere mediates between political
opportunity structures and movement action. Most ordinary people,
including most activists, are not full-time political analysts, who closely
follow and gather independent information on what is going on in the
bastions and corridors of power, and who have an intimate knowledge
of the institutional intricacies of the political system. What most people
know about politics is what they know from the media. The critics of
political opportunity structure theory are right when they point out that
factors such as “electoral instability,” “elite divisions,” or “availability
of elite allies” that are mentioned in the political opportunity literature
have no meaning as long as people do not become aware of them.
However, such awareness is not a question of free interpretation –
regardless of whether such interpretation takes the form of rational
choice or cultural framing – on the basis of full and perfect information,
but can only arise on the basis of the limited information that becomes
publicly available, and the statements and actions of elite actors that
become publicly visible. Just as protests that receive no media coverage
at all are in the words of Gamson and Wolfsfeld “nonevents,” regime
weaknesses and openings that do not become publicly visible may
be considered “non-opportunities,” which for all practical intents and
purposes might as well not exist at all.
Thus, the perception and interpretation of political opportunity struc-
tures is to an important extent pre-structured by the mass media content.
This does not imply that there is nothing left to interpret and to choose
from for movement activists, but it does mean that the range of infor-
mation to draw on and the set of available interpretations to choose
from have been narrowed down substantially. Paraphrasing the famous
one-liner about the role of agency in history one might say that people
make their own history, but on the basis of an information input not of
their own making. As I have argued above, the outcome of this selec-
tion process by which some of what is going on in the political process
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becomes visible, resonant, and legitimate and much else less so or not at
all, depends partly on factors internal to the media production process,
such as news values, news routines, and editorial cultures. However,
most of the news content consists of statements and actions by non-
media actors and reflects to an important (but not perfect) extent the
extra-medial power relations among actors.
Yet, the mass media public sphere is not a one-way street, even if the
traffic regulations are biased in favor of the top–down flow of com-
munication. Although a great share of them fail, the sheer number of
attempts to intervene from below in public contention in democratic
societies ensures that some pass the selection gates of the media and
thereby become visible for new recruits, allies, opponents, and author-
ities. Only when they achieve such visibility can movement actions,
proposals, and interpretive frames enter the range of vision of other
actors and perhaps start to influence their behavior. This may include
provoking reactions by others, which one may see as “making” oppor-
tunities, although “making manifest” or “revealing” would perhaps be
more appropriate. For example, public protest from below may inten-
sify or bring into the open conflicts of interest within the elite that had
remained contained or latent before.
An empirical illustration: Right-wing violence in Germany38
In September 1991, widely publicized anti-foreigner riots occurred in
the East German town of Hoyerswerda.39 At the time of the riots, about
200 foreigners, out of a total population of 70,000, lived in the town.
Looking only at what happened locally, the events in Hoyerswerda were
not very different from typical 18th-century events. They began with
an attack by a group of right-wing skinheads on Vietnamese street
salesmen on a city square, followed by a nightly attack against a build-
ing where some of the Vietnamese as well as a group of guestworkers
from Mozambique lived. The attacks, which involved throwing bot-
tles and stones and shouting racist abuse, continued the following two
nights, and increasingly the skinheads were joined by local youth with-
out ties to the right-wing scene. Increasing numbers of local citizens
came to watch the events, many of them applauding and cheering the
attackers.
Only on the fourth night, after the local police had finally tightened
security around the guestworker building, did the rioters turn to a hos-
tel in a different part of town where a few dozen asylum seekers lived.
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During the first days, the riots had drawn little media coverage, espe-
cially in the national media, but the expansion of the riots to the asylum
seeker hostel boosted national media attention and became the domi-
nant interpretive frame for the riots. The media described the event as
an anti-asylum seeker riot, and national as well as local politicians of all
political leanings issued statements and held press conferences, stating
their opinion on the consequences that the events should (or should
not) have for asylum policies. Conservative politicians argued that the
events showed that asylum seekers had become an insupportable burden
for the German population, while their left-wing counterparts accused
the conservatives of inciting the riots with their demand to limit asylum
rights. The events ended after 6 days with the widely publicized evacu-
ation by the authorities of what were by then summarily called “asylum
seekers” (even though the large majority of them were not) from the
town, and the local radical right’s proud declaration of Hoyerswerda as
the first “foreigner-free” city in Germany.
The public interpretation of the Hoyerswerda events as a riot against
asylum seekers must be seen in the light of the fact that they occurred
during a highly publicized and controversial public debate on asylum
legislation, which had started about a month earlier. The claim that this
debate “caused” the events in Hoyerswerda is far-fetched, given the
fact that asylum seekers were neither the initial, nor the main targets of
the rioters. However, the discursive context of the asylum controversy
had the effect that the events were seen by the media and interpreted
by politicians through the lens of this debate. Hoyerswerda became
politically relevant as an anti-asylum seeker riot, and this connected
the public resonance of the asylum debate to the Hoyerswerda events.
It was within this discursive framework that “Hoyerswerda” became
a widely publicized icon with a distinct national political meaning –
rather than the mainly locally embedded and indiscriminate outburst
of racism that it originally was. The Hoyerswerda events subsequently
led to a further intensification of the asylum debate, as well as an
enormous upsurge all over the country in radical right attacks that
were heavily focused on asylum seekers. Other radical right groups
copied Hoyerswerda as a successful example not for what it really
had been, but as it had appeared in media reports and in the reac-
tions of national politicians. The message that was conveyed to rad-
ical right activists by the reports and reactions in the media was that
attacks on asylum seekers were a recipe for prominent media cover-
age, wide resonance across the political spectrum, and last but not
least, for a certain degree of legitimacy, as many politicians at least
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partly blamed the victims and the problems they caused for the native
population.
The relevance of the public controversy over asylum policy becomes
clearer still if we compare the impact of the September 1991 events
to that of very similar attacks on Hoyerswerda’s small guestworker
population that had occurred more than a year earlier, in May 1990.40
At that time, there were no asylum seekers yet in Hoyerswerda, nor
were asylum policy or other immigration issues very salient on the
public agenda, as Germany was still preparing for monetary union and
reunification. Unlike the 1991 events, the 1990 riot received hardly any
media attention and remained an isolated and “insignificant” event that
did not spread to other locations.
In order not to draw on just one prominent example, we can alternatively
approach the development of radical right violence in Germany from
the broader perspective of the whole population of such events in the
1990s.41 Across the decade, right-wing attacks were directed against
a broad spectrum of target groups, which in one way or another were
seen by the radical right as undesired elements or enemies of the “na-
tional” cause. Apart from asylum seekers and other immigrant groups,
this target range included left-wing groups, homosexuals, handicapped
people, tourists, journalists, priests, the police, and of course the radi-
cal right’s usual suspect, the country’s Jewish community. In addition,
radical right groups demolished memorials to the Second World War
and the Holocaust. Quite often also, the violence of skinhead groups
seemed to lack any political motivation whatsoever, e.g., when they
demolished cars or attacked ordinary Germans leaving discotheques
or bars.
In the year 1990 and the first half of 1991 – before the onset of the
asylum controversy – the radical right’s target repertoire reflected this
broad range of variation. In line with the anti-communist mood just after
the fall of the Wall, the largest number of attacks (29%) was directed
against left-wing groups and symbols, including some attacks against
Soviet soldiers who were still stationed in the former GDR, as well as an
attempt to destroy a statue of the communist playwright Bertold Brecht.
Second (26%) came attacks with no discernable political motivation
directed against random targets. Together, asylum seekers (9%) and
other immigrant groups (17%) made up only one quarter of the radical
right’s targets. Jewish targets (mostly graveyards) and the police were
the most important remaining objects of the radical right’s hatred (both
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8%). Meanwhile, the aggregate number of events remained at a low
and relatively stable level, with 40 attacks nationwide in 1990, and 26
in the first half of 1991.
In July and August 1991, the public controversy over asylum rights
began gathering force, first in the national press, then also on television.
Until the events in Hoyerswerda the potential visibility, resonance, and
legitimacy that this debate offered remained by and large an unseized
opportunity for the radical right, but Hoyerwerda changed this radically.
Almost by accident, Hoyerswerda’s skinhead scene had stumbled on
an action model – attacks against asylum seeker hostels – that was
subsequently widely copied by right-wing groups elsewhere because
it seemed to guarantee not only media attention, but also favorable
reactions by national as well as local politicians, and even substantive
success in the form of the removal of the victims rather than the arrest
of the perpetrators.
The asylum debate raged on for another 2 years and was accord-
ing to surveys continuously seen by the public as the most impor-
tant problem facing the country, in spite of mass unemployment and
other difficulties related to the reunification process.42 The public vis-
ibility, resonance, and legitimacy that went with this new discursive
context dramatically improved the diffusion chances of radical right
violence. In the second half of 1991, the number of attacks rose to
140 (against 26 in the first half of the year), and another 311 attacks
occurred from January 1992 until the end of June 1993, when the asy-
lum controversy was finally closed with a change in the Constitution
that strongly limited the rights of asylum seekers. Subsequently, the
number of attacks decreased substantially, although it remained some-
what higher than before the asylum debate (on average 64 attacks per
year).
In line with the theoretical argument developed above, the asylum
debate had a very selective impact on different types of radical right
violence. The number of attacks against asylum seekers increased more
than 30-fold compared to the period before July 1991, and asylum
seekers accounted for 55% of all targets during the heyday of the asylum
debate from July 1991 until June 1993. Attacks directed against other
immigrant groups also increased, but less so, by about a factor of eight.
This is probably the combined result of the fact that the public debate
did not always neatly differentiate between asylum seekers and other
immigrants, and that it was not always easy for the attackers to make that
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distinction either. By contrast, the numbers of all other forms of radical
right violence remained virtually unchanged (an overall increase of
only 27%) and violence against some targets, such as left-wing groups,
even declined. The share of violence directed against non-immigrant
targets declined dramatically from 74% prior to July 1991, to 18%
during the asylum controversy. After the disappearance of the asylum
issue from the top of the public agenda, the target repertoire of the
radical right shifted again, the most pronounced change affecting the
share of asylum seekers among the targets of violence, which declined
to 21% (from 55%) after July 1993.
In summary, the context of the public controversy over asylum rights
dramatically enhanced the reproduction chances of some forms of rad-
ical right violence, while leaving other forms unaffected. The result
was a strong increase in the number of radical right events, as media
attention and resonant reactions by politicians and other public actors
carried the message of right-wing pioneers such as the skinheads of
Hoyerswerda to every corner of the country, inspiring groups elsewhere
– mostly without there being any organizational contacts or informal
network connections between these groups – to follow their example.
Along with the increase in the number of events went a dramatic shift in
the target repertoire of the radical right, which narrowed down from a
relatively broad range of targets at the beginning of the 1990s, to a very
strong focus on asylum seekers and to a lesser extent other immigrant
groups.
All this may partly have been the result of purposive strategic de-
cisions by radical right activists, but the extent to which this was
the case was probably limited, given the high degree of spontaneity
that characterized many of these events, and the low level of polit-
ical sophistication of most of the perpetrators.43 Anyway, a simple
trial-and-error process that requires no forward-looking planning and
anticipation can account for the changes in the volume and targets of
radical right violence. Assuming that (potential) right-wing activists
copy the successful examples they hear about through the media, and
that they repeat past strategies of their own that were successful in
gaining visibility, resonance, and legitimacy (and discontinue those
that were not), the outcomes described above follow logically. We do
not even need to assume conscious perception of the availability of
opportunities on the side of the radical right; it suffices that they im-
itate or continue to do what they learn about and what appears to
work.44
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Conclusions
I would like to conclude my discussion of selection mechanisms and
evolutionary dynamics in the public sphere with some remarks on the
limitations as well as on the further potential of this approach. To begin
with the first, it bears repeating that not everything about contentious
interaction is mediated and that direct encounters with fellow activists,
opponents, and authorities remain central to the activist experience.
My point is not to deny these experiences’ relevance, but to point out
that without the communicative linkages of the public sphere, such
experiences would – like the “forgotten” Hoyerswerda riots of 1990 –
remain isolated events that may be highly salient to those who were
there and lived through them, but would not have the potential to diffuse
and affect the wider society.
The second relativization that is appropriate is that the mass media
are not the only channel through which events and experiences can
be communicated across time and space. Movements’ own media are
one possibility, but they have the important limitation that they only
preach to the converted. The more important alternatives to commu-
nicative linkages through the mass media are social and organizational
networks. The mass media have the advantage that they are a channel
that allows messages to spread very quickly very widely. However, as
we have seen, they are also a highly selective environment in which
movements face adversaries and competitors who are generally better
placed to find a sympathetic hearing for their messages. As a result,
reliance on the mass media makes movements dependent on what oth-
ers define as important and legitimate, as is illustrated by the German
radical right’s strong dependence on the discursive context of the asy-
lum controversy. The communication of claims, strategic models, and
other movement messages through the horizontal channels of social
and organizational networks is certainly slower and usually more lim-
ited in reach. Yet, the diffusion of movement messages through these
channels may also be more stable and durable, less easily disturbed by
the fashions and fads of the media and policy agendas, and – especially
when the network links are strong – can be helpful in overcoming col-
lective action problems.45 Important as networks may be for getting
mobilization off the ground and for stabilizing it, in the end move-
ments must face the task of influencing those with whom they do not
have bonds of co-operation and solidarity, be they political authorities,
societal groups they oppose, or the mass public, whose sympathies
have to be won in order to obtain a favorable outcome. To fulfill that
386
task, there is in modern democracies often no way around the mass
media.
The further potential of the approach proposed here lies in applying
a similar evolutionary perspective to other aspects of contentious pol-
itics. The large discrepancy between the number of claims that vie
for inclusion and the relatively small number that can be accommo-
dated is a central characteristic of contentious politics more generally.
Without this discrepancy, politics would resemble a Garden of Eden
and would not be contentious at all. Of course, in other arenas con-
tenders may compete for different resources than visibility, resonance,
and legitimacy.46 For instance, in the policy arena, access to the polit-
ical agenda and budgetary allocation will be central. However, from
whichever angle we look at contentious politics, we will always find
strong selection processes that eliminate most attempts and let only
a few pass through. This implies that we need to start thinking of
contentious action in terms of populations of events, or better, per-
haps, populations of characteristics of events, rather than the focus
on movements as single, unified entities that has predominated in the
literature.47
Another aspect of the model developed here that seems to have wider
relevance is the view of movements as carriers of messages – an idea
proposed long ago by the late Alberto Melucci.48 This idea puts com-
municative processes and linkages at the center of analysis. Placed in
an evolutionary perspective, this implies a focus on movements not so
much in terms of growth or decline, radicalization or institutionaliza-
tion, or any other type of change affecting whole entities, but in terms
of the differential diffusion rates of messages – which can be substan-
tive claims, interpretive frames, or strategic models – along channels
of communication. Here I have developed this idea for the channel
of the mass media, but it seems promising to look from this angle
also at diffusion processes and selection mechanisms across network
links.49
Finally, understood as co-evolution, an approach along the lines advo-
cated in this article offers a way of theorizing the focus on interactions
and mechanisms that is currently advocated as an alternative to struc-
turalist and purposive explanations.50 Evolutionary theory can provide
the theoretical backbone for such an interactionist view on contentious
politics that bridges structure and action.51
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